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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Much has been written about trademark issues created by the 
registration and use of Internet domain names; however, trademark 
issues have arisen in a variety of other forms that result from technology 
and capabilities specific to the Internet.  For example, the technology 
that supports the Internet allows for the creation of hypertext links that 
allow Web surfers to jump from one site to another.  Internet technology 
also allows the use of metatags—keywords embedded into a Web site’s 
computer code—that allow search engines to identify the subject matter 
of the site.  These Internet technologies have forced traditional trademark 
law principles to evolve in order to provide remedies to trademark 
holders for unauthorized uses of their trademarks in ways that are likely 
to cause consumer confusion or at least allow for unfair competition.  
This Article discusses how trademark law has evolved and the ground 
that it still needs to cover. 
II.  METATAGS 
A.  The Technology 
Metatags are one type of hypertext markup language (HTML).  
HTML is the set of symbols or “tags” inserted in a file that is intended 
for display on a Web browser, such as Microsoft’s Internet Explorer or 
Netscape’s Navigator.1  These tags provide display instructions to the 
browser or describe the document’s logical structure, such as the 
location of line breaks, new paragraphs, and other display attributes that 
determine the appearance of the document to the Internet user.2  HTML 
tags are hidden from the normal view of a Web page, but they can be 
viewed with the “view source” function.3 
A metatag is the type of HTML tag that contains information about 
 
 1. See Webservice.com, HTML, at http://searchwebservices.techtarget.com/sDefi 
nition/0,,sid26_gci212286,00.html (last visited January 16, 2003). 
 2. Id. 
 3. Noel Guivani Ramiscal, The Nature and Function of Meta-Tags: Covert 
Infringement of Trademarks and Other Issues, at http://www.dcita.gov.au/crf/paper99/ 
ramiscal.html (last visited Jan. 30, 2003). 
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the document, such as its author, its expiration date, and the time it takes 
for the Web browser to reload or “refresh” the document.  Thus, 
metatags do not affect how the document is displayed when loaded into 
a browser, but are primarily intended to be read by search engines in 
order to identify, index, and catalog the content of the Web page.4 
Keyword and description metatags have become subjects of 
controversy.  For purposes of this discussion, the term “metatag” alone 
shall refer to keyword and description metatags.  These metatags allow 
Web site designers to choose terms (in the case of keyword metatags) 
and phrases (in the case of description metatags) that refer to the subject 
matter of the site.5  Internet search engines operate by identifying 
keyword and description metatags6 and then compiling a list of uniform 
resource locator (URL) addresses of Web pages whose metatags match 
the chosen search terms.7 
Thus, the primary function of metatags is to allow search engines to 
easily index a site based on the keyword and description provided by the 
Web site designer, thereby creating an organized environment for Web 
users searching for information.8  In addition, metatags allow Web site 
designers to “designate the purpose of a particular Web site that might not 
wear its real identity in its address.”9  As such, selecting the content of 
metatags provides Web site designers some control over traffic to their sites. 
However, herein lies opportunity for the abuse of metatags: using 
another’s trademark to divert Internet users that are conducting a search 
for the trademark holder’s site.  A search conducted using a trademark as 
one of the search terms will produce results that include both the site of 
the trademark holder and the site containing the trademark in its 
metatag.10  In addition, the more a particular keyword or key phrase is 
 
 4. Id.  
 5. Scott Clark, Back to Basics: META Tags, http://www.Webdeveloper. 
com/html/html_metatags.html (last updated Nov. 1998). 
 6. Id. 
 7. Ramiscal, supra note 3. 
 8. See Elizabeth Cohen, Getting Noticed: Using Metatags to Draw Potential 
Customers to Web Sites, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 8, 1998, at 19.  Metatags go beyond “free-text 
searching” to use a more indexed style of search.  The indexed style of searching serves 
to (1) “clearly denote the contents of a highly graphical site” and (2) provide search 
engine users with an “electronic confidence” that all items retrieved by the search engine 
pertain to the subject of the search.  Id. 
 9. Id. 
 10. See Arthur M. Peslak, Trademark and Name Issues on the Web, N.J. LAW., 
Mar. 2, 1998, at 39. 
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used in metatags, the higher most search engines will rank the site in its 
search results.  Thus, by repeating another’s trademark in its metatags, a 
Web site designer can manipulate search engines to rank its site higher 
than the site of the trademark holder. 
B.  Relevant Legal Issues 
Using another’s trademark in metatags smacks of trademark 
infringement, or at least some form of unfair competition.  After all, it 
may result in diversion of traffic from the trademark holder’s site to the 
site of a third party who is seeking to capitalize or free ride off the 
recognition and goodwill of that trademark.  However, are the legal 
elements of trademark infringement or unfair competition met?  Both 
sections 32 and 43(a) of the Lanham Act, which set forth the elements 
for trademark infringement and unfair competition, require another’s 
trademark to be used in commerce in connection with goods or services 
that are likely to cause confusion, mistake, or deception.11  This standard 
raises several issues when applied to use of a trademark in metatags. 
First, is the trademark used in commerce in connection with any goods 
or services if that use is not visible to the potential customer?  The 
definition of the term “use in commerce” in the Lanham Act requires 
some kind of affixation of the mark in connection with the goods or 
services.  The mark must be used (1) on goods, when “placed in any 
manner on the goods or their containers, or the displays associated 
therewith or on the tags or labels affixed thereto,” or (2) on services, 
“when it is used or displayed in the sale or advertising of services.”12  
Use of a trademark in metatags cannot be described as use on goods 
because the word “placed” implies some kind of visible display of the 
mark.  Use of a trademark in metatags could arguably fall under the 
meaning of use on services because it is a use in the sale or advertising 
of services offered over the Web site at issue. 
The invisible nature of the use leads to the second issue: Is this use 
likely to result in consumer confusion, mistake, or deception?  In 
contrast to the typical trademark infringement case—wherein another’s 
mark is used to label one’s own goods or services—the Internet user 
may never see the trademark displayed in connection with the third 
party’s Web site.  In fact, the third party’s Web site may clearly 
distinguish itself from the trademark holder—through its own domain 
name or a disclaimer.  Moreover, the nature of online consumers must be 
taken into account.  Internet users expect a search to generate a results 
 
 11. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114, 1125(a) (2000). 
 12. Id. § 1127. 
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page that lists sites of third parties, and even competitors, in addition to 
the site they seek.  Thus, Internet users will be willing to filter the search 
results to find the desired site when faced with a results page that lists 
the trademark holder’s site and competitors’ sites. 
Finally, should there be any limits to the protection afforded a 
trademark holder over third parties’ uses of its mark in metatags, 
particularly given that the primary function of metatags is to allow 
search engines to index their content? 
C.  Judicial Development 
1.  The Limitation of Likelihood of Confusion, Mistake, or Deception 
Early on, courts broadly interpreted the requirement that a mark must 
be “used in commerce in connection with any goods or services” to 
include use of a trademark as a metatag, although invisible.  As 
suggested above, courts likely found that this use occurred “in the sale or 
advertising of services”13 provided at the defendant’s Web site.  
However, the courts did not have to immediately face the more difficult 
question of whether this invisible use resulted in a likelihood of 
confusion because the early reported cases also involved a visible “bad 
act” by the defendant, such as using the plaintiff’s mark as a domain 
name, using images or text from the plaintiff’s Web site, or 
“cyberstuffing” the defendant’s Web page with the plaintiff’s mark.14 
Playboy Enterprises v. Calvin Designer Label15 is the first case in 
which the parties failed to reach settlement and the court issued a 
preliminary injunction against the defendants.  The defendants were 
adult entertainment Web site operators that used Playboy Enterprises’ 
trademark in connection with their Web site in the following ways: (1) 
registering domain names, playboyxxx.com and playmatealive.com, that 
incorporated Playboy Enterprises’ trademarks; (2) using Playboy 
Enterprises’ trademarks as part of slogans on their Web sites; and (3) 
invisibly cyberstuffing the marks “playboy” and “playmate” hundreds of 
 
 13. Id. (defining the term “use in commerce”). 
 14. Cyberstuffing is the practice of “stuffing” one’s Web page with another’s mark 
or name by repeating the mark or name either in the text of the Web page or in the 
background of the page.  In the latter case, the mark or name that is stuffed may be the 
same color as the background itself so that it is invisible or barely visible to the Internet 
user.  Cyberstuffing helps maximize the ranking of a particular Web site on the search 
results page of search engines. 
 15. Playboy Enters. v. Calvin Designer Label, 985 F. Supp. 1220 (N.D. Cal. 1997). 
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times in the background of their Web pages.16  These activities helped 
the defendants rise to the top of some search engine rankings when 
searches for the word “playboy” were executed. 
The District Court for the Northern District of California issued a 
preliminary injunction against the defendants on likelihood of confusion 
grounds.17  The defendants were enjoined from, among other things: 
using in any manner the PLAYMATE or PLAYBOY trademarks, and any other 
term or terms likely to cause confusion therewith . . . in buried code or metatags 
on their home page or Web pages, or in connection with the retrieval of data or 
information . . . or in connection with the advertising or promotion of their 
goods, services or Web sites . . . .18 
Thus, the court found the defendants’ use of the playboy and playmate 
trademarks as metatags to misguide Internet traffic and their Web sites 
to constitute a likelihood of confusion in conjunction with other, more 
apparent acts of trademark infringement, such as using domain names 
featuring Playboy Enterprises’ marks in connection with these sites. 
Playboy Enterprises v. AsiaFocus, Int’l19 also involved the use of 
Playboy Enterprises’ trademarks as metatags, in addition to other 
unauthorized uses of Playboy Enterprises’ trademarks.  AsiaFocus is the 
first legal ruling that resulted in an award of damages.  The defendants, 
operators of adult entertainment Web sites containing adult photo 
collections and selling related merchandise, used the trademarks 
“playboy” and “playmate” as part of their domain names in the text of 
their Web sites, and as metatags.20  Other factors favored a finding that 
AsiaFocus’s use of the terms “playboy” and “playmate” would be likely 
to cause confusion.  AsiaFocus’s site consisted of computer images of 
nude women, the core of Playboy Enterprises’ business.21  AsiaFocus 
also offered merchandise, such as key chains, calendars, and 
wristwatches under the name “Asian Playmates.”22  Playboy Enterprises 
owned federal trademark registrations for each of these goods.  
AsiaFocus also actively encouraged other Web sites to promote “Asian 
Playmates” goods and services through a “click for cash” program, by 
which the defendants offered monetary compensation to other Web site 
owners who displayed the Asian Playmates banner advertisement on 
their Web sites.23  Each site would receive four cents for each “hit” that 
 
 16. Id. at 1221. 
 17. Id. at 1221–22. 
 18. Id. at 1221. 
 19. Playboy Enters. v. AsiaFocus, Int’l, No. 97-734-A, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
10359, at *1 (E.D. Va. Feb. 2, 1998). 
 20. Id. at *6–9. 
 21. Id. at *17. 
 22. Id. at *18. 
 23. Id. at *9. 
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AsiaFocus received from the particular Web site where the banner 
advertisement appeared.24 
The District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia found “a 
strong likelihood that the consuming public would believe that the 
defendants’ Web site was sponsored by or somehow affiliated with 
[Playboy Enterprises],”25 as well as dilution because “the capacity of 
[Playboy Enterprises] to identify its goods and services was 
diminished . . . .”26  In particular, AsiaFocus’s “purposeful tactic of 
embedding the trademarks PLAYMATE and PLAYBOY in the hidden 
computer source code . . . epitomizes [AsiaFocus’s] ‘blurring’ of [Playboy 
Enterprises’] trademarks.”27  In addition, the court found that “[t]he 
accessibility of the infringing Web sites, the defendants’ successful 
number of hits, and the blatant display of [Playboy Enterprises’] 
trademarks are all factors that compound [Playboy Enterprises’] 
damage.”28  Thus, the court found that AsiaFocus’s conduct in this case 
warranted the award of statutory damages under 15 U.S.C. § 1117(c) and 
consequently awarded $3 million based on the maximum of $100,000 
per mark per type of goods or services sold, offered for sale, or 
distributed.29 
Niton Corp. v. Radiation Monitoring Devices, Inc.30 provides the first 
instance in which a defendant was preliminarily enjoined from using 
metatags comprising of the plaintiff’s trade name, as well as terms 
relevant only to the plaintiff’s business.31  The parties in this case were 
competitors in the specialized market of manufacturing x-ray 
fluorescence (XRF) instruments that detect the presence of lead in paint.  
Niton initially filed suit against Radiation Monitoring Devices (RMD) 
for using false and misleading statements in advertising and marketing 
its own product, including statements on RMD’s Web site that included 
the Niton trade name.32  Thereafter, Niton discovered that many of the 
metatags on RMD’s site were identical to those used on Niton’s Web 
 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. at *18. 
 26. Id. at *20. 
 27. Id. at *21. 
 28. Id. at *21–22. 
 29. Id. at *22. 
 30. 27 F. Supp. 2d 102 (D. Mass. 1998). 
 31. Id. at 105. 
 32. Id. at 103–04. 
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site.33  Specifically, the only metatag on five Web pages of RMD’s site 
was “The Home Page of Niton Corporation, makers of the finest lead, 
radon and multi-element detectors.”34  In addition, several metatags 
included keywords, such as “radon,” that were relevant to products sold 
by Niton but not by RMD.35 
While declining to define the nature of the defendant’s conduct as 
trademark infringement, dilution, or unfair competition, the court found 
that Niton was likely to prevail on “its contention that RMD’s Internet 
Web sites and means of attracting users . . . have been used by RMD in a 
way likely to lead users to believe” that RMD was also known as or 
affiliated with Niton Corporation or made Niton products, and that RMD 
Web sites were Niton Web sites.36  The injunction appeared to be based 
on the nature of RMD’s actions, which the court characterized as 
“deceptive and immediately harmful,”37 instead of a showing of 
likelihood of confusion, mistake, or deception. 
2.  Initial Interest Confusion 
While the Niton case highlights the difficulty in categorizing the use 
of another’s trademarks in metatags as trademark infringement, 
dilution, unfair competition, or some other legal doctrine, Brookfield 
Communications, Inc. v. West Coast Entertainment38 directly confronts 
this issue.  This case is also significant because it is the first to analyze 
the use of another’s trademark or trade name as a metatag alone and not 
in the context of other improper uses of that trademark or trade name, 
such as in the text of the Web site or as part of a domain name.  While 
search engines listed the defendant’s Web site along with that of the 
plaintiff, the defendant used a domain name and identifying information 
on its Web site that would distinguish itself from the plaintiff. 
Brookfield relied upon the doctrine of initial interest confusion.  This 
doctrine imposes liability even where circumstances mitigate any 
consumer confusion before goods are sold or services are rendered.  
Instead, initial interest confusion recognizes exactly what is wrong with 
using another’s trademark in a metatag—capitalizing on the trademark 
holder’s goodwill to divert consumers from the trademark holder’s site 
to one’s own site. 
Brookfield Communications (Brookfield) and West Coast Entertainment 
 
 33. Id. at 104. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. at 102. 
 37. Id. 
 38. 174 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir. 1999). 
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(West Coast) started out in related but noncompetitive fields, but became 
competitors as both sought to expand their businesses into e-commerce.  
Brookfield began using the mark “moviebuff” in December 1993 in 
connection with software featuring searchable databases containing 
information related to and intended exclusively for the entertainment 
industry.  Brookfield began offering a scaled-down version of the 
software to consumers in 1994, made the product available through its 
Web site, brookfieldcomm.com, in 1996, and registered the mark for 
these goods and related services in September 1998.39 
West Coast was one of the nation’s largest video rental store chains.  
It owned the service mark, “the movie buff’s movie store” and used the 
term “movie buff” as part of various phrases to promote goods and 
services available at its video stores.40  West Coast registered the domain 
name “moviebuff.com” with Network Solutions in February 1996, 
although it conducted no business activity at this address.41  In October 
1998, West Coast announced its intention to launch a Web site at this 
address that would include searchable databases related to movies 
intended for prospective video purchasers.42  The district court denied a 
temporary restraining order sought by Brookfield enjoining West Coast 
from, among other things, using the mark “moviebuff” as a domain 
name and “in buried code or metatags on their home page or Web 
pages.”43 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, first disposing 
of the domain name issue by finding a likelihood of confusion by West 
Coast’s use and registration of the domain name “moviebuff.com.”44  The 
court then turned to the question of West Coast’s use of moviebuff as a 
metatag “at any other domain address other than ‘moviebuff.com’ 
(which we have determined that West Coast may not use).”45  This 
question specifically addressed West Coast’s use of moviebuff as a 
metatag at West Coast’s other Web site, westcoastvideo.com. 
The court recognized that West Coast’s use of the term “moviebuff” in 
its metatags meant that a search for moviebuff would bring up a list 
 
 39. Id. at 1041–42. 
 40. Id. at 1042. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. at 1043. 
 44. Id. at 1045–60. 
 45. Id. at 1062. 
PRINTERALBERTANDABBATI.DOC 1/30/2020  10:19 AM 
 
350 
including westcoastvideo.com.46  However, the resulting confusion 
would not be as great as if West Coast used the moviebuff.com domain 
name.47  Confusion was reduced because the search results page would 
display both West Coast’s and Brookfield’s sites so that the user would 
be able to scan the list and find the particular site being sought.48  
Moreover, should the user choose the westcoastvideo.com site, confusion 
would not be likely because the site had a distinct domain name and 
prominently displayed the “West Coast” name on its home page.49 
Instead, the court based West Coast’s liability for use of moviebuff in 
its metatags on initial interest confusion, finding that “use of another’s 
trademark in a manner calculated to ‘capture initial consumer attention, 
even though no actual sale is finally completed as a result of the 
confusion, may be still an infringement.’”50  Although Web surfers 
looking for Brookfield’s moviebuff products and taken by a search 
engine to westcoastvideo.com would not be confused as to the source of 
the site, at least some of those consumers may simply utilize West 
Coast’s offerings rather than going through the trouble of backtracking 
to Brookfield’s site because the two companies offer such similar 
services.  By using Brookfield’s trademarks to initially attract the 
interest of consumers looking for moviebuff products, and to ultimately 
divert them to its own Web site, West Coast misappropriated and rode 
on the goodwill that Brookfield developed in its mark.  The court 
analogized West Coast’s use of Brookfield’s trademark as a metatag to a 
situation wherein a competitor of West Coast, say Blockbuster, posts a 
billboard on the highway reading “West Coast Video: 2 miles ahead at 
Exit 7” and West Coast is actually located at exit eight while 
Blockbuster is at exit seven.51  The unwitting consumer looking for West 
Coast’s store takes exit seven, but finds Blockbuster instead, and could 
decide to rent a video there instead of continuing to search for West 
 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. (quoting Dr. Seuss Enters. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394, 
1405 (9th Cir. 1997); citing Mobil Oil Corp. v. Pegasus Petroleum Corp., 818 F.2d 254, 
257–60 (2d Cir. 1987)).  In Mobil Oil Corp. v. Pegasus Petroleum Corp., the Second 
Circuit held that Pegasus Petroleum’s use of Pegasus was infringement of Mobil’s 
trademark, a flying horse symbol in the form of the Greek mythological creature 
Pegasus.  Even though Mobil acknowledged that potential consumers would typically 
realize that Pegasus Petroleum was unrelated to Mobil before consummating an actual 
sale, “potential purchasers would be misled into an initial interest in Pegasus Petroleum” 
by at least preliminarily thinking that Pegasus Petroleum was associated with Mobil.  
Mobil Oil Corp., 818 F.2d at 260. 
 51. Brookfield Communications, Inc., 174 F.3d at 1064. 
PRINTERALBERTANDABBATI.DOC 1/30/2020  10:19 AM 
[VOL. 40:  341, 2003]  Metatags, Keywords, and Links 
  SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
 351 
Coast.52  The fact that customers are not confused because they are fully 
aware that they are purchasing from Blockbuster does not diminish the 
effect of initial interest confusion; in this case it would allow 
Blockbuster to divert consumers by misappropriating West Coast’s 
acquired goodwill.53 
However, the court distinguished between West Coast’s improper use 
of moviebuff in its metatags from its legitimate use of the term “movie 
buff” as a metatag.  The latter use is permitted as fair use because 
“movie buff” is a descriptive term routinely used in the English language 
to describe a movie devotee.54  “Even though [moviebuff] differs from 
‘Movie Buff’ by a single space, that difference is pivotal.”55 
3.  Limitations on Protection of Trademarks as Metatags 
Brookfield suggests one limitation on the protection of trademarks as 
metatags: terms and trademarks should remain available for others to 
legitimately use as metatags—to describe or refer in good faith to the 
content of their sites.  This limitation corresponds to the fair use defense 
for trademark infringement, which protects a party using trademarks 
“fairly and in good faith to describe to users the goods or services” of 
such party, or their geographic origin.56  “The ‘fair use’ defense, in 
essence, forbids a trademark registrant to appropriate a descriptive term 
for his exclusive use and so prevent others from accurately describing a 
characteristic of their goods.”57 
Playboy Enterprises v. Welles58 bucked the trend of cases prohibiting 
the use of another’s trademarks as metatags by finding that the defendant 
used Playboy Enterprises’ trademarks in good faith.59  The defendant in 
this case, Terri Welles, was awarded the playmate of the year title in 
1981.  Since that time, Ms. Welles appeared in thirteen issues of Playboy 
magazine and eighteen newsstand specials.  Ms. Welles claimed that 
since 1980, she had always referred to herself as a “playmate” or 
 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. at 1066. 
 55. Id.  
 56. 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4) (2000).  
 57. New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ’g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 306 (9th Cir. 
1992) (quoting Soweco, Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., 617 F.2d 1178, 1185 (5th Cir. 1980)). 
 58. 7 F. Supp. 2d 1098 (S.D. Cal. 1998), aff’d without opinion, 162 F.3d 1169 (9th 
Cir. 1998). 
 59. Id. at 1104. 
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“playmate of the year,” with Playboy Enterprises’ knowledge.60 
Ms. Welles operated a Web site, terriwelles.com, featuring adult photo 
collections of herself and others.  Eleven of the fifteen pages of the Web 
site included statements, in varying font sizes, which disclaimed the 
site’s sponsorship or endorsement by, or association with, Playboy 
Enterprises.61  The Web site activity that Playboy Enterprises sought to 
enjoin on the grounds of trademark infringement, dilution, and unfair 
competition, involved: (1) Ms. Welles’s use of the mark, “playmate of 
the year” in the title of her home page and link page; (2) cyberstuffing 
the background of her Web pages with the barely visible watermark 
“PMOY ’81” (an abbreviation for playmate of the year 1981); and (3) 
using the trademarks “playboy” and “playmate” as metatags.62 
The court denied Playboy Enterprises’ motion for a preliminary 
injunction on its claims of trademark infringement and dilution.63  Ms. 
Welles’s visual uses of Playboy Enterprises’ marks were in good faith 
and constituted fair uses because “the trademarks that defendant uses, 
and the manner in which she uses them, describe her and identify her.”64  
In addition, the court recognized that Playboy Enterprises did not 
contractually restrict, and typically encouraged, playmates to use their 
titles for self-promotion and for the promotion of the company, such as 
using these terms in the title of an autobiography.65  Playboy Enterprises 
contended that permitting these uses of the playmate title did not allow 
Ms. Welles to trade on Playboy Enterprises’ marks so as to compete 
with Playboy Enterprises.  However, the court found that Ms. Welles’s 
uses of Playboy Enterprises’ trademarks, the inclusion of disclaimers, as 
well as other good faith factors—not using Playboy Enterprises’ famous 
bunny logo or incorporating a Playboy Enterprises mark as part of her 
domain name—indicated that the “defendant is selling Terri Welles and 
only Terri Welles on the Web site.  There is no overt attempt to confuse 
the websurfer into believing that her site is a Playboy-related site.”66  
Absent was any discussion of Ms. Welles’s good faith in using Playboy 
Enterprises’ mark to cyberstuff her Web pages with the barely visible 
PMOY ’81 mark. 
With respect to Ms. Welles’s invisible use of Playboy Enterprises’ 
trademarks as metatags, the court similarly found no trademark 
infringement and dilution because the marks were used “in good faith to 
 
 60. Id. at 1100. 
 61. Id. at 1100–01. 
 62. Id. at 1101. 
 63. Id. at 1105. 
 64. Id. at 1103. 
 65. Id. at 1102–03. 
 66. Id. at 1104. 
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index the content of Welles’s Web site.”67  Analogizing metatags to the 
subject index of a card catalog, in that both give researchers—whether 
human or computerized—a clearer indication of the content of what they 
search, the court found that Playboy Enterprises’ marks as metatags 
merely referenced the legitimate editorial uses of the terms in the text of 
Ms. Welles’s Web site.68 
4.  The Boundaries of Fair Use and Initial Interest Confusion 
The decision in Playboy Enterprises v. Welles does not mean that use 
of another’s trademark in metatags will automatically be protected as 
fair use as long as the trademark refers to some aspect of the Web site.  
The boundary of fair use has been explored where the defendant has 
claimed that its use of another’s trademark in metatags is legitimate 
because its Web site refers to commentary or criticism about the 
trademark holder.  Ultimately, the standard of good faith defines this 
boundary.  The good faith standard is determined by factors such as 
whether the defendant offers goods or services in competition with the 
trademark owner, the frequency that the defendant uses the trademark in 
metatags, and whether the defendant engages in any other practices that 
cause search engines to prioritize the defendant’s site in its search 
results. 
In the recent case of J.K. Harris & Co. v. Kassel69 the U.S. District 
Court for the Northern District of California refused to apply the fair use 
doctrine to allow uses of another’s mark that unfairly manipulated search 
engines, and found that these uses diverted consumers away from the 
plaintiff’s services.70  The parties were competitors in the field of tax 
representation and negotiation—representing clients to eliminate or 
reduce their assessed tax liability and negotiate favorable terms.  J.K. 
Harris advertised its services at jkharris.com, while Kassel used the Web 
site, taxes.com, to advertise its competing services and to criticize and 
publish unfavorable statements about J.K. Harris. 
J.K. Harris sought a preliminary injunction to prevent Kassel from 
certain manipulative practices in connection with its taxes.com Web site 
that caused search engines to list the taxes.com site along with the 
 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. 2002 WL 1303124, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 22, 2002). 
 70. Id. at *6. 
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jkharris.com site in their search results pages.71  Specifically, J.K. Harris 
alleged that this was done by “creating keyword density”—using the 
J.K. Harris trade name excessively throughout the taxes.com Web site.72  
In addition, Kassel increased the font size and underlined sentences 
containing the J.K. Harris trade name, and placed these sentences at the 
top of several Web pages.73  In so doing, Kassel repetitively used the 
J.K. Harris trade name in its header and underline tags.74  Finally, Kassel 
used the J.K. Harris trade name as part of links to sites with information 
about J.K. Harris.75  Thus, by repeatedly using the J.K. Harris trade 
name throughout the text and HTML tags of the taxes.com site, Kassel 
guaranteed that search engines would find and prioritize the taxes.com 
site upon a search for “J.K. Harris” because engines search text and tags 
for keywords matching requested search terms.  According to J.K. 
Harris, the result of this conduct was that Web users who conducted a 
search for “J.K. Harris” were simultaneously given a chance to visit the 
taxes.com site.76  In fact, most search engines returned a link to taxes.com 
under the title “complaints about JK Harris pile up” among the first ten 
links.77  According to J.K. Harris, these practices constituted trade name 
infringement pursuant to section 43(a) of the Lanham Act78 because they 
created initial interest confusion among consumers looking for J.K. 
Harris’s services.79 
Before reaching the issue of initial interest confusion, the court 
considered whether Kassel’s uses of the J.K. Harris trade name could 
constitute “nominative fair use” because, according to Kassel, these uses 
were necessary to warn consumers about allegedly harmful business 
practices.80  The court applied a three factor test from an earlier Ninth 
Circuit case81 in order to determine when an unauthorized use of a 
trademark is permissible: (1) the product or service in question is not 
 
 71. Id. at *1–2. 
 72. Id. at *1.  Creating keyword density is a form of cyberstuffing.  See supra note 14. 
 73. Id. at *3. 
 74. Id. at *1.  Header and underline tags are types of HTML tags that provide 
display instructions to the Web browser opening the file that contains the Web site in 
question.  While header and underline tags are not solely intended to provide indexing 
information to search engines, like keyword and description metatags, some search 
engines do read these tags and use them in determining how high to rank a site. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. at *4. 
 77. Id. 
 78. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2000). 
 79. Id. at *2, *4.  J.K. Harris also based its request for injunctive relief on alleged 
violations of state laws prohibiting unfair competition and false and misleading 
advertising.  Id. at *2. 
 80. Id. at *4. 
 81. New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ’g Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 308 (9th Cir. 
1992). 
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readily identifiable without use of the trademark; (2) only so much of the 
mark is used as is reasonably necessary to identify the product or 
service; and (3) the mark is not used in any manner that would suggest 
sponsorship or endorsement of the trademark owner.82 
Under this three part test, J.K. Harris’s request to enjoin all of Kassel’s 
uses of its trade name was overly broad.83  The uses of the trade name in 
links to Web pages about the plaintiff and dissemination of truthful 
factual information, even if critical, was nominative fair use.84  
However, Kassel’s other uses of the trade name did not satisfy the 
second factor of the fair use test because they were not reasonably 
necessary to identify the product or services.85  Specifically, the court 
found that Kassel did not need to underline and otherwise emphasize 
sentences containing the J.K. Harris trade name, nor did they need to use 
the trade name as a header or underline tags.86  Further, it was not 
necessary to use the trade name and permutations thereof seventy-five 
different times through the Web site in order to identify J.K. Harris’s 
services.87  Unlike the decision in Playboy Enterprises v. Welles,88 these 
uses were not fair because the metatags listed the trade name so 
repeatedly that they functioned to manipulate the result of search engines 
instead of merely indexing the content of the site. 
The court also enjoined these unauthorized uses as likely to cause 
initial interest confusion among consumers because the services 
provided by the parties were competitive, and the design of Kassel’s 
Web site indicated that Kassel intended to induce consumer confusion.89  
Thus, the court agreed with J.K. Harris that potential customers might be 
diverted to Kassel’s services.90  While consumers would not believe 
that J.K. Harris was the sponsor of the negative publicity on the 
taxes.com site, they might choose to investigate these charges before 
visiting J.K. Harris’s services.91  Consumers might then decide to secure 
tax representation services from Kassel, instead of J.K. Harris, because of 
 
 82. J.K. Harris, 2002 WL 1303124, at *4. 
 83. Id. at *5. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. 7 F. Supp. 2d 1098 (S.D. Cal. 1998), aff’d without op., 162 F.3d 1169 (1998). 
 89. J.K. Harris, 2002 WL 1303124, at *6. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. at *4. 
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the negative comments, or simply because the services offered by both 
were sufficiently similar that they would not bother to find J.K. Harris’s 
site.92 
In contrast, courts may be less likely to find initial interest confusion 
and more likely to apply the fair use doctrine where the parties are not 
competitors.  In Bihari v. Gross,93 the plaintiffs, Bihari and Bihari 
Interiors (Bihari), sought to preliminarily enjoin the defendants Craig 
Gross and Yolanda Trublio (Gross) from using the trademark “Bihari 
Interiors” as a metatag in the defendants’ Web sites.94  Bihari had 
provided interior design services in connection with the Bihari and Bihari 
Interiors trade names since 1989; Gross was a former client of Bihari 
Interiors who was less than satisfied with the relationship.95  Gross used 
the Web sites designscam.com and manhattaninteriordesign.com to 
criticize Bihari.  The home page of each Web site began with a caption 
reading “The Real Story Behind Marianne Bihari & Bihari Interiors.”96  
Also included on the Web sites were numerous links to third party sites, 
many of which offered interior design services competitive with those of 
Bihari.97  Bihari moved for an injunction for trademark infringement 
under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act.98 
The District Court for the Southern District of New York easily 
disposed of the issue of likelihood of confusion because the Gross Web 
sites did not sell any goods or provide services competitive with Bihari 
Interiors.99  Moreover, because the critical nature of the Web sites was 
evident from the first pages of the sites, no reasonable Web user would 
believe that the negative comments about Bihari were sponsored by or 
associated with Bihari.100 
The court also found that Bihari failed to prove a likelihood of initial 
interest confusion because Gross’s use of the Bihari Interiors mark as a 
metatag was not a bad faith attempt to trick users into visiting his Web 
sites.101  The basis of this conclusion must have been the fact that Bihari 
and Gross were not competitors.  “[T]he Gross websites cannot divert 
Internet users away from Bihari’s websites because Bihari does not have 
a competing website.”102  According to the court, the unauthorized use of 
 
 92. Id. 
 93. 119 F. Supp. 2d 309 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). 
 94. Id. at 311. 
 95. Id. at 312. 
 96. Id. at 313. 
 97. Id. at 311. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. at 318–19. 
 100. Id. at 319. 
 101. Id. at 319–20. 
 102. Id. at 320. 
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the Bihari Interiors mark brought users to sites that provided Web users 
with information about Bihari, albeit negative, rather than diverting 
users from Bihari.103 
Finally, the court found that even if the Gross Web sites caused 
consumer confusion, use of the Bihari Interiors mark in the metatags was 
protected fair use because it was used in its descriptive sense as an index 
or catalog.104  That is, Gross included Bihari Interiors in the metatags of 
his Web sites simply because the sites provide information about Bihari 
Interiors and Marianne Bihari.105  Moreover, use of this mark as a 
metatag was the only way Gross “can get his message to the public” 
because prohibiting such use might foreclose access to Gross’s 
commentary.106  “Courts must be particularly cautious of overextending 
the reach of the Lanham Act and intruding on First Amendment 
values.”107  In addition, the court found that a finding of fair use was 
appropriate because Gross acted in “good faith.”108  Gross chose domain 
names that did not incorporate Bihari’s trade name or trademark and 
included the disclaimer: “Keep in mind that this site reflects only the 
viewpoint and experiences of one Manhattan couple.”109 
Although the facts of the Bihari case are similar to the facts of the J.K. 
Harris case, there are two key differences that account for the different 
outcomes of each case.  First and foremost, the J.K. Harris defendant was 
a competitor of the plaintiff, while the Bihari defendant was not.  The 
defendant in the J.K. Harris case used the site at issue to criticize the 
plaintiff and to advertise and offer competing services, while the 
defendant in the Bihari case ostensibly used the site only to provide 
negative commentary about the plaintiff.  Consequently, the J.K. Harris 
court found that the defendant’s site diverted consumers away from the 
plaintiff and ultimately led to initial interest confusion, while the Bihari 
court did not.  Second, the J.K. Harris defendant used the mark in dispute 
in header and underline tags, which are intended to provide instructions to 
a Web browser about display effects—in this case, where to display 
headers and underlining—while the mark in the Bihari case was used as a 
metatag, which functions only to describe the content of the Web site.  
 
 103. Id. at 322. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. at 323. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. at 323–24. 
 109. Id. 
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This practice, along with the excessive use of the J.K. Harris trade name 
throughout the site, evidenced Kassel’s bad faith and intent to divert 
consumers from J.K. Harris’s site and at least initially induce confusion. 
III.  KEYWORDS 
A.  The Technology: What Is a Keyword? 
Online advertisers seek to optimize the effectiveness of their 
advertisements by targeting particular consumers.  The desire to market 
to specialized consumers in e-commerce has led many of the large 
search engines to sell search terms, or keywords, to advertisers.  The 
operators of these search engines program their servers to link banner 
advertisements to the purchased keyword.  As a result, when an Internet 
user types a particular word into a search engine, the advertisement of 
the company that has bought this word from the search engine will 
appear as a banner advertisement along with the search results page, 
usually at the top. 
Unfortunately for most trademark holders, this ostensibly innocuous 
practice has developed into what some regard as a new form of cyber 
piracy.  Search engines sell others’ trademarks as keywords, often to 
competitors of the trademark holder.110  As a result, the purchaser uses that 
trademark to trigger its advertising without having to compensate the 
trademark holder for the value and goodwill that led Web surfers to search 
for that mark in the first place.  The predatory nature of this use becomes 
particularly apparent when compared to practices in the traditional 
advertising context, where advertisers pay magazines or networks to use 
their name, reputation, and the attractiveness of their content to sell the 
advertisers’ products.111  Moreover, banner advertisements typically 
contain clickable hyperlinks to the advertisers’ own Web sites, which 
facilitates diversion of traffic away from the Web site associated with the 
trademark holder. 
B.  Legal Issues 
The sale and purchase of keywords involves many of the same legal 
questions raised by using another’s trademark in metatags.  Does this 
practice “use” a trademark in commerce in connection with any goods or 
services that is likely to cause confusion, mistake, or deception, as 
 
 110. See Robert C. Scheinfeld & Parker H. Bagley, Using Others’ Trademarks to 
Trigger Internet Advertisements, N.Y.L.J., Mar. 24, 1999, at 3. 
 111. See Dale M. Cendali et al., An Overview of Intellectual Property Issues 
Relating to the Internet, 89 TRADEMARK REP. 485, 539–40 (1999). 
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required by the Lanham Act?112  Is the sale or purchase of a trademark as 
a keyword a use at all?  The answer depends in large part on whether the 
accused use involves the sale of a trademark by a search engine or the 
purchase of a trademark by an advertiser.  The former is more difficult to 
categorize as a proper use because the services provided by the search 
engine are typically not competitive with the goods or services of the 
trademark holder.  However, the purchase of a trademark by a 
competitor of the trademark holder could qualify as use “in the sale or 
advertising of services,” as required by the Lanham Act’s definition of 
“use in commerce” on services,113 and may be likely to cause confusion, 
mistake, or deception. 
Moreover, given the context of the Internet and the savvy of many 
Internet users, is the appearance of banner advertisements at the top of 
search results pages likely to cause confusion, mistake, or deception as 
to the association or affiliation between the advertiser and the trademark 
holder?  Such confusion or mistake is more likely to occur where the 
advertiser and the trademark holder offer competing goods or services 
and the advertiser uses a banner advertisement that does not identify the 
source of the advertising.  However, even if the advertiser does identify 
itself in a manner that minimizes confusion, is the advertiser engaging in 
unfair competition by free riding off the recognition and goodwill of the 
trademark?  After all, without the goodwill associated with the 
purchased trademark, its banner advertising would never have been 
triggered in response to a search for that trademark.  On its face, this 
practice may appear to be akin to grocery store cash registers that 
generate a coupon for, say, Pampers diapers upon the purchase of 
Huggies diapers.  The crucial difference is that Pampers’s “advertising” 
does not appear until after the purchase of the Huggies diapers and does 
not divert consumers from their intended purchases.  In contrast, banner 
advertising appears before the Internet user can even link to the site that 
it seeks.  Further, banner ads may be displayed in a manner that makes 
the Internet user’s search more difficult by occupying a large part of the 
search results page and thereby obscuring the trademark holder’s site. 
The only judicial decision on the use of trademarks as keywords, 
Playboy Enterprises v. Netscape Communications Corp.,114 has left 
some of these issues unanswered.  However, the decision does provide 
 
 112. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114, 1125(a) (2000). 
 113. Id. § 1127. 
 114. 55 F. Supp. 2d 1070 (C.D. Cal. 1999), aff’d, 202 F.3d 278 (9th Cir. 1999). 
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some guidelines that trademark holders should follow in asserting their 
trademark rights to prohibit the selling and purchasing of trademarks as 
keywords. 
C.  The Playboy Enterprises Decision 
Playboy Enterprises sued two operators of one of the Internet’s most 
popular search engines, excite.com, to prohibit them from generating 
hard core porn banner advertisements when Web surfers searched for the 
terms “playboy” and “playmate.”115  The defendants (Excite) sold a 
package of over 450 words to operators of hard core adult entertainment 
sites, including the words “playboy” and “playmate.”116  Playboy 
Enterprises sought a preliminary injunction on the grounds of trademark 
infringement and dilution for (1) marketing and selling the package of 
words to Playboy Enterprises’ competitors in the adult entertainment 
field; (2) programming, or “keying,” the banner ads to run in response to 
the search terms “playboy” and “playmate;” and (3) actually displaying 
the hard core banner advertisements on the search results page.117  As a 
result, Playboy Enterprises contended that Internet users were diverted 
away from its official Web site and Web sites sponsored or approved by 
Playboy Enterprises to other competitive adult entertainment sites.118  
The banner advertisements, while animated and designed to entice the 
Internet user to “click here,” did not contain any information about the 
advertiser,119 a practice that is arguably more likely to confuse the 
consumer into thinking that the advertisement is associated with Playboy 
Enterprises.  Excite responded that it did not use Playboy Enterprises’ 
trademarks as trademarks.120 
The United States District Court for the Central District of California 
agreed with Excite, holding that Playboy Enterprises failed to show that 
Excite used the terms “playboy” and “playmate” in their trademark form 
instead of in their ordinary, descriptive connotations.121  Playboy and 
playmate are, in addition to trademarks owned by Playboy Enterprises, 
English words in their own right.122  Internet users cannot conduct 
searches using the trademark form of the words—playboy® and 
playmate®.123  “Thus, whether the user is looking for goods and services 
 
 115. Id. at 1072. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. at 1073. 
 121. Id. at 1073–74. 
 122. Id. at 1073. 
 123. Id. 
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covered by [Playboy Enterprises’] trademarks or something altogether 
unrelated to [Playboy Enterprises] is anybody’s guess.”124 
The court proceeded to hold that even if the words “playboy” and 
“playmate” were used as trademarks, Playboy Enterprises failed to show 
that confusion was likely to result from that use.125  Focusing again on 
the fact that the trademarks at issue were English words in their own 
right, the court refused to allow a trademark holder to remove a word 
from the English language merely by acquiring its trademark rights.126 
Moreover, the initial interest confusion theory applied in the Internet 
context by the Brookfield Communications case was rejected in this 
context because, unlike the parties in Brookfield, Excite and Playboy 
Enterprises were not competitors.127  As a result, Excite’s activities did 
not capture Internet users looking for Playboy Enterprises’ site in the 
same way that West Coast’s use of Brookfield’s trademarks as 
metatags did.128  In contrast to the analogy set forth in Brookfield 
Communications, the court provided this analogy for the selling of 
trademarks: 
This case presents a scenario more akin to a driver pulling off the freeway in 
response to a sign that reads ‘Fast Food Burgers’ to find a well-known fast food 
burger restaurant, next to which stands a billboard that reads: ‘Better Burgers: 1 
Block Further.’  The driver, previously enticed by the prospect of a burger from 
the well-known restaurant, now decides she wants to explore other burger 
options.  Assuming that the same entity owns the land on which both the burger 
restaurant and the competitor’s billboard stand, should that entity be liable to 
the burger restaurant for diverting the driver?129 
The court’s reasoning, and particularly its refusal to answer this 
question in the affirmative, implies that Playboy Enterprises may have 
named the wrong defendants.  Excite is not a competitor of Playboy 
Enterprises, nor does Excite use Playboy Enterprises’ marks (assuming 
that the terms are used in their trademark forms) “in connection with the 
sale, offering for sale, distribution or advertising of any goods or 
services on or in connection with which such use is likely to cause 
confusion” as required by 15 U.S.C. § 1114.130  While Excite may have 
 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. at 1074–75. 
 126. Id. at 1074. 
 127. Id. at 1074–75. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. at 1075. 
 130. 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (2000) (relating to registered trademarks, such as the playboy 
and playmate marks). 
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marketed and sold the words “playboy” and “playmate” and programmed 
banner ads to appear in response to search requests for these terms, these 
activities are certainly not what is typically understood to be use in 
commerce in connection with goods or services confusingly similar to 
Playboy Enterprises’ use.  Instead, the purchasers of the terms 
“playboy” and “playmate” may have been more appropriate defendants 
because they were competitors of Playboy Enterprises and, arguably, 
used the terms in connection with their adult entertainment services in a 
way that was likely to cause confusion with Playboy Enterprises’ 
services.  Thus, the court may have found that the terms “playboy” and 
“playmate” were being used as trademarks instead of common English 
words if the purchasers used the terms because they were direct 
competitors of Playboy Enterprises. 
Predictably, the court also found, for all the reasons set forth above, 
that Excite’s activities did not dilute by blurring or tarnishing Playboy 
Enterprises’ marks.131  The Ninth Circuit affirmed the court’s denial of a 
preliminary injunction without opinion.132 
Playboy Enterprises v. Netscape Communications Corp. appears to 
suggest some strategies for trademark holders that object to the sale of 
their trademarks as keywords.  First, claims may be more likely to stand 
against the purchase of trademarks by advertisers that offer competing 
goods or services rather than against the sale of these trademarks by 
search engines.  Secondly, an arbitrary or fanciful mark that has no other 
meaning in the English language may be more successful than a 
suggestive or descriptive mark. 
IV.  HYPERLINKING 
A.  The Technology: What Is a “Link”? 
Hypertext links, or “links” for short, allow users to move to another 
Web site or to another part of the current site without having to type 
complicated URL addresses.133  In fact, hyperlinking created and defined 
the Web—the graphical, linkable portion of the Internet.134  A link 
typically appears on a Web page as an underlined and highlighted URL 
address or as a graphic, which may or may not incorporate the trademark 
or other designation identifying the linked site. 
 
 131. Playboy Enters., 55 F. Supp. 2d at 1087–89. 
 132. Playboy Enters. v. Netscape Communications Corp., 202 F.3d 278 (9th Cir. 1999). 
 133. Emily Madoff, Freedom to Link Under Attack: Web Community Up in Arms 
over Lawsuits, N.Y.L.J., June 23, 1997, at S1. 
 134. Martin J. Elgison & James M. Jordan III, Trademark Cases Arise from Meta-
Tags, Frames, NAT’L L.J., Oct. 20, 1997, at C6. 
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The main advantage of linking is convenience.  Links make the Internet 
a powerful resource that provides its users with an interconnected world 
of knowledge, all made possible by the ability to link information 
available on one site to other sites.  However, trademark holders have 
objected to this practice and have asserted trademark infringement and 
unfair competition in two different linking scenarios. 
In the first, a site links to the trademark holder’s Web site, or the 
“linked site,” which may cause a blurring in the distinction between the 
proprietary material of the linking site and that of the linked site.  That 
is, the link may provoke a mistaken belief that the linking site is 
affiliated or associated with the linked site, in violation of section 43(a) 
of the Lanham Act.135  The link also may lead to a dilution claim under 
section 43(c) of the Lanham Act,136 particularly because frequent linking 
may diminish the ability of a famous mark on the linked site to identify 
goods and services associated with that mark.  Particularly problematic 
are “deep links,” which connect the linking site to a subsidiary page of 
the linked site.  These links bypass the home page of the linked site, 
which typically set forth its trademarks, logos, and other identifying 
information.  As such, deep links are even more likely to mislead users 
into thinking that the two sites are associated or affiliated.  Moreover, 
bypassing the home page also typically means skipping the advertising 
sold by the linked site, which is often its main source of income.  
Advertisers pay a premium for advertisements placed on the home page 
of Web sites, and the value of advertising space on a home page depends 
greatly on the volume of hits it receives. 
In the second scenario, the link incorporates a trademark (or a 
confusingly similar term) in its domain name to operate a site that appears 
to be noncommercial and noncompeting.  The noncommercial nature of 
these sites would ordinarily insulate them from trademark infringement 
liability because there is no use in commerce.  However, if these sites link 
away from the trademark holder’s site to third parties’ sites, these links 
may make the sites commercial and may create a likelihood of confusion, 
or otherwise unfairly compete, with the trademark holder’s site. 
1.  Linking to a Trademark Holder’s Site 
The following cases exemplify the objections of owners of linked sites 
 
 135. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2000). 
 136. Id. § 1125(c). 
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against unauthorized links to their sites.  Trademark infringement and 
unfair competition have turned out to be suitable causes of action for 
such unauthorized linking because the facts of each case indicate that the 
defendants were not trying to pass themselves off as the plaintiffs.  
Instead, the defendants’ primary wrong was to operate parasitic sites that 
lifted content from others’ sites, often in great volume, and sold 
advertising and attracted users based on unauthorized uses of that 
content.  Thus, the defendants took for free material that cost the owners 
of the linked sites significant expenses, resources, and time to create and 
organize.  As such, the defendants deprived the linked sites of 
advertising dollars and users to which they were arguably entitled.  This 
type of wrong may be best characterized as misappropriation, which is 
catchall common law tort that recognizes the investment involved in 
creating a product, service, or business and protects against unauthorized 
taking or free riding off of that value.  Courts, however, have addressed 
this wrong as copyright infringement137 and trespass to personal 
property.  The linking cases discussed below have been selected because 
the plaintiffs asserted claims for trademark infringement and unfair 
competition, even though the cases were ultimately decided on other 
nontrademark grounds. 
Ticketmaster filed suit against Tickets.com,138 another online 
company that provided entertainment, sports, and travel tickets, event 
information, and related products and services.  Tickets.com operated like 
a clearinghouse by directing users to tickets wherever they are available, 
including other ticketing agents on the Web, such as Ticketmaster.  
However, Tickets.com also had exclusive relationships with 4000 
venues, providing them with ticketing software and distribution services, 
and earned commissions for directly selling the tickets for those 
venues.139 
Ticketmaster’s complaint alleged both copyright infringement and 
unfair competition for providing deep links into Ticketmaster’s site, 
bypassing introductory pages, and advertising on Ticketmaster’s home 
 
 137. In fact, the first written judicial opinion inquiring into potential liability for 
deep linking was based exclusively on principles of copyright infringement and, in part, 
addressed whether Web site operators linking to another’s site, which displayed 
plagiarized texts of the Mormon Church, could be held liable for contributory 
infringement.  Intellectual Reserve v. Utah Lighthouse, 75 F. Supp. 2d 1290 (D. Utah 
1999). 
 138. Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.com, Inc., 2000 WL 1887522, at *1 (C.D. Cal. 
Aug. 10, 2000). 
 139. See Bob Tedeschi, Ticketmaster Sues Again over Links, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 10, 
1999, at B10, available at http://www.nytimes.com/library/tech/99/08/cyber/articles/ 
10tickets.html (last visited Feb. 9, 2003). 
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page.140  Because Ticketmaster generated revenue by selling advertising 
on its home pages, the practice of deep linking diminished the value of 
those pages.141  Ticketmaster did allow other sites, such as Yahoo and 
Knight-Ridder, to maintain deep links into its site, but only pursuant to 
terms agreed upon by the parties.142  In addition, Ticketmaster claimed 
that, in order to earn its commissions, Tickets.com falsely stated that 
tickets for certain events were not available through online ticketing 
sources, including Ticketmaster, other than the ticket brokers with whom 
Tickets.com had relationships.143  Ticketmaster’s suit also included 
copyright infringement claims directed to Tickets.com’s purported 
unauthorized downloading and reproduction of material from 
Ticketmaster’s site, such as events listings.144 
The District Court for the Central District of California dismissed four 
of Ticketmaster’s counts against Tickets.com and set forth guidelines by 
which Ticketmaster had to prove its case.145  In so doing, the court voiced 
support for the practice of hyperlinking, stating that hyperlinking does not 
itself involve a violation of the Copyright Act because no copying is 
involved.146  However, the court refused to dismiss the copyright 
infringement claim because Ticketmaster did allege copying to the extent 
that it contended Tickets.com copied its interior Web pages in order to 
extract factual information, such as event, place, time, date, and price.147 
The court also refused to dismiss Ticketmaster’s claims for federal 
unfair competition, false advertising, state unfair business practices, and 
interference with business advantage.148  However, Tickets.com was not 
 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. 
On some Web sites, advertising space deep inside a site is more valuable, 
because it lets advertisers reach an audience with a specific interest.  On 
ticketing sites, however . . . [a] home page seen by entertainment fans in great 
numbers is likely to be more valuable to an advertiser than, say, a page selling 
tickets for a Marilyn Manson concert. 
Id. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.com, Inc., 2000 WL 525390, at *1 (C.D. Cal. 
Mar. 27, 2000). 
 146. Id. at *2. 
 147. Id.  However, the court ultimately refused to grant a preliminary injunction on 
the copyright aspects of this case as “fair use” reverse engineering.  Ticketmaster v. 
Tickets.com, 2000 WL 1887522, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2000). 
 148. Ticketmaster Corp., 2000 WL 525390, at *1. 
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preliminarily enjoined under these theories because Tickets.com did not 
pass itself off as Ticketmaster and, therefore, the customer was not 
misled.149  Tickets.com accompanied its link with clear statements that it 
did not sell the tickets itself, but would refer the customer to another 
broker.150  The customer ended up on the Ticketmaster home page filled 
with Ticketmaster logos.151 
The online auction site eBay joined the fray by filing suit against 
Bidders’ Edge,152 an online auction comparison site that functioned as a 
one stop shop for auction hunters by indexing, organizing, and linking to 
listings on major auction Web sites, including eBay’s site.  Bidders’ Edge 
was able to do this by using two common Internet tools.  “Robots” and 
“spiders” are programs that automatically search auction hosts like eBay 
for the latest posted auctions on a particular item and assemble a database 
of retrieved information so that users can compare various auctions.  
Then, users can directly deep link to the page on the host site that features 
the desired auction.  While eBay ultimately ends up making money from 
Bidders’ Edge customers, eBay claimed that Bidders’ Edge was engaging 
in unfair competition because it profited off the success of eBay, which 
the company spent millions of dollars developing.153 
Included in eBay’s nine-count complaint were allegations for trespass to 
personal property because Bidders’ Edge “used, accessed and intermeddled 
with and continues to use, access and intermeddle with eBay’s computer 
systems for defendant’s own commercial benefit.”154  eBay also alleged that 
Bidders’ Edge’s deep links into eBay’s site constituted unfair business 
practices, copyright infringement, misappropriation, and interference with 
prospective economic advantage.155  Bidders’ Edge also allegedly infringed 
and diluted the eBay mark by repeatedly displaying the mark in its auction 
listings, and engaged in false advertising by representing that eBay had a 
smaller proportionate share of the relevant auctions than it actually did.156 
The District Court for the Northern District of California preliminarily 
enjoined Bidders’ Edge from accessing eBay’s computer system by its 
robot or the use of “any automated querying program” on the ground of 
trespass to eBay’s proprietary computer system.157 
 
 149. Ticketmaster Corp., 2000 WL 1887522, at *5. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. 
 152. eBay, Inc. v. Bidder’s Edge, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058 (N.D. Cal. 2000). 
 153. See Debra Baker, Bid for Fair Practice, 86 A.B.A.J. 22 (2000). 
 154. eBay, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d at 1063. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. at 1060. 
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2.  Linking as a Basis of Commercial Use of a Mark 
Trademark infringement and dilution claims have also been raised 
where the defendant’s Web site was clearly not competitive with the 
plaintiff’s business, such as sites that criticize or parody the plaintiff’s 
business.  Trademark infringement claims often founder on the issue of 
whether such sites use a mark “in commerce . . . in connection with the 
sale, offering for sale, distribution or advertising” of goods or 
services.158  Moreover, challenging these sites under federal trademark 
dilution grounds requires proof that the sites make commercial use of the 
marks in dispute.159  Using a Web site for criticism or parody does not 
typically constitute commercial activity; but can linking to other sites 
establish the threshold commercial use requirement?  The answer 
depends on the commercial nature of the linked sites.  If so, can these 
links change the nature of a criticism or parody site that does not appear 
to compete with the plaintiff?  The answer depends on whether the 
linked sites offer goods or services that are competing with those of the 
plaintiff. 
The defendant in OBH, Inc. v. Spotlight Magazine Inc.160 was found 
liable for trademark infringement and dilution for, in part, linking away 
from the plaintiff’s Web site and to another Web site that advertised 
competing products.161  The plaintiff, OBH, Inc., owned the Buffalo 
News, the daily newspaper of Buffalo, New York, which included an 
advertising periodical called Apartment Finder.162  OBH had owned a 
registration for the mark “The Buffalo News” since 1980.163 
Defendant Tortora was the president of the Apartment Spotlight 
Magazine, which advertised available apartments in Buffalo and the 
surrounding areas.164  One online version of this magazine was published 
at buffalonyapartments.com.165  In April 1999, Tortora registered the 
domain name “thebuffalonews.com,” and began operating a site at that 
address.166  The site opened with the greeting “Welcome to 
www.thebuffalonews.com,” followed by a statement disclaiming 
 
 158. 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (2000). 
 159. Id. § 1125(c). 
 160. 86 F. Supp. 2d 176 (W.D.N.Y. 2000). 
 161. Id. at 185–98. 
 162. Id. at 181–82. 
 163. Id at 181. 
 164. Id. at 181–82. 
 165. Id. at 182. 
 166. Id. 
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affiliation with or endorsement by the Buffalo News and specifying that 
the site was intended only for parody and criticism of the Buffalo 
News.167  The site contained hyperlinks to other Web pages containing 
negative opinions and stories about the newspaper, as well as to other 
news-related Web sites, including local news competitors of the Buffalo 
News.168  The site also included a link to another of Tortora’s sites, 
buffalonyapartments.com, which advertised apartments for rent.169  It 
appears that the links in this case were not deep links, but links to surface 
pages of other news-related sites and buffalonyapartments.com.170 
The defendants argued that, as a threshold matter, their use of the 
plaintiff’s mark did not constitute “use in commerce . . . in connection 
with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or advertising of any goods 
or services on or in connection with which such use is likely to cause 
confusion . . . .”171  The defendants’ site located at the address containing 
the plaintiff’s mark “The Buffalo News” did not itself offer or sell goods 
or services competitive with OBH and was not even commercial in 
nature.172  In addition to use of a domain name confusingly similar to 
OBH’s registered trademark, the District Court for the Western District 
of New York found that the use in commerce requirement was satisfied 
because the site included a link to Tortora’s other Web site, 
buffalonyapartments.com.173  This linked site, featuring an online 
version of Tortora’s Apartment Spotlight Magazine, was operated for a 
primarily commercial purpose.174  This link to Tortora’s online magazine 
also established that the defendants were using the OBH mark “at least 
in part, to offer their own services over the Internet.”175  That the linked 
online publication directly competed with OBH’s online publication 
factored into the court’s conclusion that a likelihood of confusion existed 
because “such a high degree of proximity” between Tortora’s originating 
site and the linked site also operated by Tortora “increases the likelihood 
of confusion among Internet users.”176 
Moreover, observing that infringing use of another’s mark “in 
connection with goods or services” may also be in connection with the 
goods or services offered or distributed by the trademark holder, the 
court found that the links potentially diverted site users who had 
 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. at 183. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. at 185. 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. at 185–86. 
 174. Id. at 186. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. at 188. 
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mistakenly arrived at Tortora’s site from OBH’s site.177  These Web 
surfers may have failed to continue searching for OBH’s site and instead 
may have opted to select Tortora’s buffalonyapartments.com site or one 
of the other news-related links that pointed to sites in direct competition 
with OBH.  In this way, the defendants’ appropriation of OBH’s mark 
constituted use in connection with OBH’s distribution of its services.178 
People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v. Doughney179 is another 
example of a link providing a basis for use in commerce.  The defendant 
registered the domain name “peta.org” and created a Web site called 
“People Eating Tasty Animals.”180  Doughney claimed he created the 
Web site as a parody of the plaintiff, People for the Ethical Treatment of 
Animals (PETA), a worldwide animal rights organization.181  The Web 
site also included at least thirty links to various sites promoting meat, 
fur, leather, hunting, and animal research organizations, all of which 
held views antithetical to PETA’s views.182  The plaintiff brought suit 
for federal, state, and common law trademark infringement and unfair 
competition.183  The court relied in part on Doughney’s many links to 
commercial operations offering goods and services to establish that the 
mark was used in commerce, in connection with goods and services.184 
Likewise, in Bihari v. Gross,185 the defendants were disgruntled ex-
customers of Ms. Bihari’s interior design services.  The defendants 
registered the domain names “bihari.com” and “bihariinteriors.com” in 
order to criticize Bihari and Bihari Interiors.  Also appearing on the Web 
sites were links to Web sites that promoted the services of other interior 
designers.  Bihari brought suit for trademark infringement under section 
43(a) of the Lanham Act.  These links established commercial use 
because they acted “as a conduit, steering potential customers away from 
Bihari Interiors and toward its competitors, thereby transforming his 
otherwise protected speech into a commercial use.”186 
The issue of commercial use in connection with goods and services 
 
 177. Id. at 186. 
 178. Id. 
 179. 263 F.3d 359 (4th Cir. 2001). 
 180. Id. at 362–63. 
 181. Id. at 363. 
 182. Id. at 365. 
 183. Id. at 362. 
 184. Id. at 365. 
 185. 119 F. Supp. 2d 309, 312 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); see supra notes 93–109 and 
accompanying text. 
 186. Id. at 318. 
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arose in an unusual context in Ford Motor Co. v. 2600 Enterprises.187  In 
that case, the only use of the mark was in the programming code that 
created a link to the plaintiff’s Web site.  Ford Motor Co. (Ford) attempted 
to prevent a hacker group from pointing the domain name 
“fuckgeneralmotors.com” to Ford’s official Web site, ford.com.188  2600 
Enterprises used the Ford mark in its programming code, which is 
invisible to the Internet user but which creates an automatic hyperlink to 
the ford.com site.189  Although there was no content at the 
fuckgeneralmotors.com site, when Internet users entered this domain 
name into a Web browser, they were automatically linked to the 
ford.com Web site.190  Ford filed suit, alleging trademark infringement, 
dilution, and false designation of origin under the Lanham Act.191  The 
court denied Ford injunctive relief because the creation of an unseen, 
programmatic link to Ford’s site was not a commercial use or a use in 
connection with goods or services of the mark within the meaning of the 
Lanham Act.192 
In order to establish commercial use for its dilution claim, Ford relied 
on earlier cases,193 in which the registration and use of domain names 
incorporating another’s mark were found to dilute the mark.194  In each 
cases, the defendant’s uses of the disputed domain names was 
commercial because they promoted the defendant’s products or raised 
funds for the defendant’s cause.195  Moreover, the domain names were 
designed to harm the plaintiff commercially because they prevented the 
plaintiff from using the mark and kept Internet users from locating the 
plaintiff’s site.196  In contrast, 2600 Enterprises’ domain name did not 
incorporate any of Ford’s trademarks, nor did it use Ford’s marks for its 
own financial benefit.197  Instead, the only use of the Ford mark, in the 
invisible programming code creating a link from fuckgeneralmotors.com 
 
 187. 177 F. Supp. 2d 661 (E.D. Mich. 2001). 
 188. Id. at 662. 
 189. Id. at 664. 
 190. Id. 
 191. Id. at 662. 
 192. Id. at 663–66. 
 193. Planned Parenthood Fed’n of Am., Inc., v. Bucci, 1997 WL 133313, at *1 
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 24, 1997) (stating that the defendant, an active participant in the anti-
abortion movement, registered the domain name plannedparenthood.com and set up a 
Web site advertising an anti-abortion book); Jews for Jesus v. Brodsky, 993 F. Supp. 282 
(D.N.J. 1998), aff’d, 159 F.3d 1351 (3d Cir. 1998) (stating that the defendant used the 
plaintiff’s mark in the domain name jewsforjesus.com to raise funds through the sale of 
merchandise). 
 194. Ford Motor Co., 177 F. Supp. 2d at 663. 
 195. Id. at 664. 
 196. Id. 
 197. Id. 
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to ford.com, was not a commercial use.198  According to the court, the 
dilution statute’s commercial use requirement should not extend so far as 
to include any use that the trademark holder may object to because of the 
domain name or other content of the linking Web page.199  The court 
disagreed with the earlier courts by finding that the commercial use 
requirement was not satisfied simply because an unauthorized use may 
disparage the mark’s owner.200 
With respect to the claims for trademark infringement and unfair 
competition, Ford failed to show that the mark was used in connection 
with goods and services.201  2600 Enterprises’ use of the Ford mark in its 
programming code, unlike the unauthorized use of a trademark as a 
domain name, did not inhibit Internet users from reaching the Web sites 
that were most likely to be associated with Ford.202  Moreover, because 
the unauthorized use in no way competed with Ford’s offering of goods 
or services, the “in connection with goods or services” requirement was 
not satisfied simply because prospective users may have faced some 
difficulty in finding the home page they sought.203 
In cases like OBH, Inc. v. Spotlight Magazine Inc.,204 wherein the 
activity complained of consisted of providing links to third party sites or 
to other sites that the defendant owned or controlled, a likelihood of 
confusion generally only arises if the goods or services of the trademark 
owner and the alleged infringer are the same or related.  Links to third 
party sites may implicate trademark infringement claims if they change 
the nature of defendant’s business into one related to the plaintiff, and 
may implicate dilution claims if the third party sites contain content that 
tarnish the plaintiff’s mark. 
For instance, in ImOn, Inc. v. ImaginOn, Inc.,205 links did not convert 
the defendant’s Internet television software offered at imon.com into a 
business similar to the plaintiff’s “Imon” Internet portal and dial-up 
services.206  The court found that the services rendered in connection with 
the Imon mark and the imon.com domain name were sufficiently different 
 
 198. Id. at 665. 
 199. Id. 
 200. Id. at 664. 
 201. Id. at 665. 
 202. Id. 
 203. Id. 
 204. 86 F. Supp. 2d 176 (W.D.N.Y. 2000). 
 205. 90 F. Supp. 2d 345 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). 
 206. Id. at 352–53. 
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as to avoid a likelihood of confusion.207  The links from the defendant’s 
imon.com site failed to make confusion more likely because they led to 
other software products offered by defendant, such as a search engine, that 
were not sufficiently competitive with the plaintiff’s business.208 
However, in Nissan Motor Co. v. Nissan Computer Corp.,209 links to 
third party sites created a likelihood of confusion between the 
defendant’s computer services offered at nissan.com and nissan.net and 
the plaintiff’s automobile services.210  The defendant, Uzi Nissan, had 
been using Nissan as a trademark and trade name for a variety of 
businesses and registered the domain names “nissan.com” and 
“nissan.net” to provide computer related services.211  The plaintiff 
brought suit for trademark infringement when the defendant modified 
these sites to include advertisements that linked to various third party 
sites promoting and selling automobiles.212  The court found that the 
defendant’s domain name infringed the plaintiff’s Nissan mark because 
the car-related advertisements and links created a similarity in the goods 
and services of the parties and reflected the defendant’s intent to confuse 
consumers.213  The court allowed the defendant to continue conducting 
its computer-related business under the Nissan mark, to use the Nissan 
mark in its metatags, and to display third party advertisement and links 
not related to cars, but prohibited it from displaying on its sites any car-
related advertising or links.214 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Should trademarks, as one form of intellectual property, be protected 
when used on the Internet?  Yes.  Some have argued that trademarks, or 
any other kind of intellectual property, should not be protected to the 
same extent as they are in the real world because the Internet should 
provide a means of openly sharing information without the restrictions 
or concerns about what is legal.  However, as the Internet became more 
and more commercial, trademark holders increasingly sought to protect 
their trademarks and other means of source identification.  The courts 
have likewise responded by recognizing that consumers rely on brand 
names and other means of source identification in the virtual world as 
much as they do in the real world.  As the cases discussed in this Article 
 
 207. Id. 
 208. Id. at 351. 
 209. 89 F. Supp. 2d 1154, aff’d, 246 F.3d 675 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 210. Id. at 1164. 
 211. Id. at 1162. 
 212. Id. at 1156. 
 213. Id. at 1164. 
 214. Id. at 1165. 
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indicate, the courts are willing to tweak trademark law and unfair 
competition principles to protect unauthorized uses that do not fit the 
facts of traditional trademark infringement in the real world.  The courts 
should continue to shape trademark law to protect those unauthorized 
uses that may not be visible to consumers and that may not even result in 
a likelihood of consumer confusion, but nonetheless give competitors an 
unfair advantage.  In particular, trademark holders should be able to 
assert their trademark rights to block those actions and technologies that 
allow for unfair competition, specifically, those actions that allow others 
to free ride and benefit from the goodwill generated by the trademark 
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